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INTRODUCTION

This booklet provides background on three proposed changes in the
Code of Professional Ethics and the By-Laws of the Institute.
All of the proposals have been approved by the Council of the In
stitute, on the recommendation of the executive committee. The pro
posal to amend the By-Laws to increase the size of the executive commit
tee originated with the committee on structure. The proposal to repeal
Rule 3.03 of the Code on competitive bidding has the unanimous approval
of the committee on professional ethics as well as the executive committee.
The proposal in regard to the disciplinary provisions of the By-Laws is
jointly sponsored by the Trial Board and the ethics committee.
In accordance with the By-Laws, the proposals were included in the
call to the annual meeting held in Boston, Mass., on October 3, 1966,
for discussion without action.
The By-Laws also provide that, following the annual meeting, the
proposed amendments shall be submitted to all members for a vote by
mail ballot, accompanied by a statement prepared by the secretary
summarizing the arguments presented for and against them.
This booklet is issued in conformity with these requirements. The
presentation of each proposal is in two parts: an historical summary of
the considerations which led to the recommendation, and a resume of the
discussion, if any, which occurred on the proposal at the annual meeting.
In order to become effective, the proposed amendments must be
voted upon by at least one-third of the members and must be approved
by at least two-thirds of those voting.
The ballots will be valid and counted only if received by M arch 20,
1967, as provided in the By-Laws. Ballots should also be signed; unsigned
ballots will not be counted.
John L. C arey
Secretary

January 2 0 ,1 9 6 7
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PROPOSAL NO. 1
Repeal of Rule 3.03 on Competitive Bidding

I. Background
The Institute has had a prohibition against competitive bidding in its
ethical code for a quarter of a century. The original rule, adopted in
1941, precluded a member from making a competitive bid for profes
sional engagements in any state whose CPA society or accountancy
board prohibited such bids.
The present Rule, adopted in 1962, constitutes an outright prohibi
tion of competitive bidding. It reads as follows (Article 3, Rule 3.03,
of the Code of Professional Ethics):
A member or associate shall not m ake a competitive bid for a pro
fessional engagement. Competitive bidding for public accounting
services is not in the public interest, is a form of solicitation, and is
unprofessional.

All of the discussion which led to the adoption of the revised Rule
clearly indicates that it was not intended to deprive the public of the
right to obtain estimates of the cost of professional services. On the con
trary, the Rule was designed to protect the public against any unscru
pulous practitioner who might seek to acquire clients by offering to
perform services at a fee so low as to make it impossible for him—
without a financial sacrifice— to comply with professional standards in
the conduct of his work. Such a price-cutting approach to a professional
practice, if widely adopted, could depress the quality of accounting serv
ices, and this in turn would adversely affect the public welfare.
When the proposed revision of the Rule was discussed at the annual
meeting in 1961, the committee on professional ethics promised to develop
an official interpretation of it which would seek to clarify the distinc
tion between a competitive bid and a legitimate response to a prospective
client’s request for an estimate of the cost of an engagement.
7

In the process of working with the committee in the formulation of
this interpretive opinion, the Institute’s legal counsel, Covington & Burl
ing, became increasingly convinced that it was “highly probable” that any
challenge to the legality of Rule 3.03 in a proceeding brought under the
Federal anti-trust law would be sustained in the courts.
The executive committee then engaged the law firm of Cahill, Gordon,
Reindel & Ohl of New York to undertake an independent appraisal of the
question. The second firm strongly supported the opinion of Covington
&Burling that, under developing legal concepts, it would be wise to repeal
the competitive bidding rule because of the grave risk of being found
in violation of the anti-trust laws.
The views of counsel were reported to the executive committee early
in the fall of 1965. It was extremely difficult for the committee to accept
the possibility that a professional society could be placed in legal jeopardy
by its efforts to maintain a high quality of service to the public. However,
the committee reluctantly felt that it could not afford to disregard the
advice of law firms with extensive experience in anti-trust litigation.
The committee, therefore, alerted the Council to the problem at the
fall meeting of the Institute’s governing body in Dallas, Texas, on Septem
ber 18, 1965, and indicated that it planned to conduct a comprehensive
review of the situation during the six months prior to the spring meeting
of Council.
Representatives of counsel were invited to appear before separate
meetings of the executive committee and the committee on professional
ethics to respond to inquiries designed to explore all aspects of the
situation.
After these appearances, both committees voted unanimously to
recommend to Council that an amendment repealing Rule 3.03 should
be submitted to the members for a mail ballot.
At its meeting last May, the Institute’s governing body approved the
recommendation by a vote of 135 to 53.
Following this action by Council, it became apparent from members’
inquiries that some apprehension existed about the effects of a repeal of
the competitive bidding rule. It was suggested, for example, that if the
Rule were deleted from the Code, other provisions would have no bearing
on the adequacy of quoted fees. In view of these concerns, the committee
on professional ethics met on August 16 and unanimously agreed to
issue an opinion which states in effect that the quoting of a clearly inade
quate fee may in some circumstances be regarded as evidence of a viola
tion of the solicitation rule (3.02) or of the rule on reporting standards
(2.02). The opinion, which will be effective whether or not the rule
against competitive bidding is repealed, reads as follows:
8

Opinion No. 18: Fees and Professional Standards

In determining the amount of his fee, a CPA may assess the
degree of responsibility being assumed in the engagement, the time
and manpower required to perform the service in conformity with
the standards of the profession, the skills needed to discharge his pro
fessional obligation to the client and the public, the value to the
client of the services rendered, and the customary charges of profes
sional colleagues. Other considerations may also be involved. No
single factor can be controlling.
It is characteristic of all professional persons to be more con
cerned with fulfilling their responsibilities to the public than with
immediate financial reward. On occasions they may appropriately
choose to serve a client for a fee less than cost, or indeed without any
compensation whatever.
However, to quote a fee in advance of an engagement in an
amount clearly inadequate to provide fair compensation for perform
ing service in accordance with accepted professional standards may
be regarded, in some circumstances, as evidence of solicitation in
violation of Rule 3.02 of the Code of Professional Ethics. Without
attempting to specify all circumstances that might be relevant in
determining the propriety of a particular quotation, it would be ap
propriate to consider whether there were any facts suggesting that
such inadequate fee had been fixed as a part of a plan or design to
solicit business.
In such cases of inadequate fees there may be a temptation to
minimize losses by reducing the amount of work below that required
by Rule 2.02 of the Code, with serious consequences for third parties
who rely upon opinions on financial statements.

II. Discussion at Annual Meeting
1

.

Arguments for Repeal

The basic question involved in this issue can be simply stated: is
Rule 3.03 on competitive bidding likely to be considered by the courts
to be in violation of the anti-trust laws of the United States?
Two eminent law firms, after exhaustive research, have advised the
Institute that in their considered judgment a substantial anti-trust hazard
does exist. (The opinions of both firms appear in a separate booklet which
accompanies the membership ballot.)
The main points in their opinions can be summarized in these words:
1. The Sherman Act declares that “every contract, combination . . .
9

Arguments fo r Repeal ( continued)

or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States”
is illegal. Among the restraints covered by the statutes are all agreements
among competitors relating to prices. Regardless of the difficulties in
applying Rule 3.03 in a particular situation, it obviously enjoins members
from attempting to obtain clients by engaging in price competition. It is,
in effect, an agreement among the members that they will not engage in
price competition.
2. Among the restraints of trade covered by the Sherman Act are
all agreements among competitors relating to prices. Although this is
often described as directed against “price fixing,” it is not confined to
agreements to fix particular prices. It applies broadly to all agreements
among competitors that suppress or restrain price competition in any
way. Such agreements are illegal per se — that is, they cannot be justified
on any grounds including the contention that (as in the case of Rule 3.03)
the objective was protection of the public welfare. As the United States
Supreme Court has stated in one case: “Congress has not left with us
the determination of whether or not particular price-fixing schemes are
wise or unwise, healthy or destructive. It has not permitted the age-old cry
of ruinous competition and competitive evils to be a defense to pricefixing conspiracies. It has no more allowed genuine or fancied competitive
abuses as a legal justification for such schemes than it has the good
intentions of the members of the combination.”
3. The prohibitions in the Sherman Act are limited to activities in
restraint of interstate trade or commerce. The courts in recent years,
however, have increasingly broadened the concept of interstate com
merce. There seems little reason to assume, in view of the scope and
nature of the practices of many members, that the courts would hold
that the accounting profession was essentially local in character. More
over, while a substantial number of members may largely operate within
the boundaries of a single state, Rule 3.03 does not apply to them alone;
it applies to all members.
4. The anti-trust statutes refer to “trade or commerce,” and it may
be argued that this term does not embrace a professional service. It is
true that the U. S. Supreme Court has never ruled directly on the question
of whether the practice of law, medicine or accounting is “trade or com
merce” within the meaning of the Sherman Act. But after a review of the
cases cited in their opinion, the Institute’s counsel concludes that “it is
likely that the Supreme Court would hold* that the professions do not
enjoy any general immunity from the application of the Sherman Act.”
Even if it be assumed, however, that the Supreme Court might apply more
lenient standards to the rules and regulations of professional societies
than it applies to ordinary commercial activities, the Institute’s counsel
10

Arguments for Repeal ( continued)

concludes that the Court is not likely to relax anti-trust standards to the
point of permitting the members of professional societies to engage in
arrangements that restrict price competition.
None of the official agencies of the Institute which approved the sub
mission of this amendment to repeal Rule 3.03—the executive commit
tee, the committee on professional ethics, and the Council—is in favor
of competitive bidding. The Rule was adopted, in all good faith, as a
measure of protection for the public. A professional accounting service
is not a commodity which can be delivered at a predetermined price
based on a set of precise specifications. Only the CPA himself is really
qualified to evaluate the amount of work which is required in a particular
engagement to enable him to comply with the profession’s standards and
thus discharge his obligation to all those who may rely upon him. Any
approach which appears to place a premium on price is certain to gen
erate destructive tensions within the profession; but, even more impor
tantly, it may have the effect in some instances of depressing the quality
of the CPA’s services— and this could result in grave injury to the public.
However, all the members of the executive committee and the ethics
committee, and the large majority of Council who voted in favor of repeal
became convinced that the social desirability of the Rule was unlikely to
sustain it in an anti-trust proceeding, that the adverse consequences flowing
from such a proceeding would be substantial, and that the objective of
the Rule could be achieved by legal means without running the risks
inherent in retention of the Rule.
Even with the deletion of the Rule from the Institute’s Code, Opinion
No. 18 of the ethics committee suggests that members should set their
fees in the light of the responsibilities imposed upon them by Rule 3.02
on solicitation and Rule 2.02 on reporting standards.
Moreover, in some 37 states, the state boards of accountancy have
issued regulations against competitive bidding comparable to the Insti
tute’s Rule. Similar action could be taken in the other states— except
possibly in the few states with anti-trust statutes of their own. If certain
conditions are or have been met in the issuance of these regulations, it
seems clear that they are immune to any challenge under the Federal
anti-trust laws. In addition, of course, the board rules apply to all CPAs
—not merely to members of the Institute.
It is argued that the Institute’s repeal of Rule 3.03 would lead state
boards to consider repeal of their own rules on competitive bidding.
The basis for this argument has never been explained, and there appears
to be no justification for it in the light of counsel’s opinion that state
board rules have an entirely different legal status.
Several other aspects of this question deserve consideration.
11

Arguments fo r Repeal ( continued)

It may be contended that the absence of any legal assault on the Rule
over an extended period justifies the assumption that no attack is likely
to be directed against it in the future.
This contention, in the words of one of the legal opinions filed with
the Institute, suggests “the triumph of hope over experience.” Nor should
any comfort be derived from the fact that other professional organiza
tions may have prohibitions on competitive bidding which have not as
yet been challenged. In the view of the attorneys consulted by the Institute,
these organizations are equally vulnerable to attack under the anti-trust
laws.
In evaluating the prospects of a challenge to the legality of the Rule,
it is essential for everyone concerned about the welfare of the Institute
to consider the penalties, which might be inflicted upon it if the challenge
proved successful.
They could be severe.
The Federal government could bring criminal proceedings in which
the penalties against each defendant could be a fine of up to $50,000, or
imprisonment up to one year, or both, for each offense under each section
of the Act. The Institute could be a defendant in such a proceeding. Also,
any Council member, officer, staff executive, or committee member, who
had authorized, ordered or done anything to enforce, to apply or to in
terpret the Rule might be a defendant.
The Federal government could also bring a civil suit to enjoin the
enforcement of the Rule or to order its deletion from the Code.
In addition, it could bring a civil suit to recover simple damages for
any money damages suffered by it or any of its agencies that were caused
by the Rule.
Private persons, and states, municipalities and agencies thereof could
also recover treble damages suffered by them that were caused by the
Rule plus a reasonable fee for their attorney. They might also obtain
injunctive relief against the enforcement of the Rule.
Among the situations which might cause the legality of the Rule to
be raised in one or more of the above described proceedings are:
(a) Attempted enforcement of the Rule against a member of the
Institute. This might result in a treble damage and injunction suit by the
member or a complaint by the member to the Department of Justice
resulting in its instituting a criminal or civil proceeding;
(b) A municipal agency or corporation, which is aggrieved because
it could not obtain competitive bids for accounting services, might institute
legal proceedings on its own behalf as indicated above as a private person
or it might complain to the Department of Justice and thus instigate a civil
or criminal proceeding by it. The same thing could happen in the case of
12

Arguments for Repeal ( continued)

a Federal agency which had been thwarted in an attempt to get competi
tive bids. Although it could not sue independently, it could certainly
complain to the Department of Justice and it must be assumed that its
complaint would receive serious attention.
In view of the possible drastic penalties, those involved in the dis
ciplinary machinery of the Institute are naturally reluctant to summon
any member to trial for engaging in competitive bidding. No action, in
fact, has yet been taken under the Rule. None is likely to occur in the
future. The Rule, therefore, is already inoperative.
It may be suggested that the mere existence of the Rule— even though
it may not have been enforced—has had a salutary effect in discouraging
a price-cutting approach to the professional practice of accounting, and
that this result has been beneficial in protecting the public. But the failure
to enforce a rule can also encourage a cynical attitude toward the entire
Code of Professional Ethics.
The decision to seek repeal of Rule 3.03 is based on the considered
view of the Institute’s counsel— a view strongly endorsed by another
firm— that it is “highly probable” that the Rule would be declared illegal
in any proceeding brought under the anti-trust laws.
That view is both supported and challenged by other attorneys con
sulted by a few state societies and members.
The opposing opinions which have been made available to the Insti
tute have been carefully reviewed by Covington & Burling— and nothing
in them has led the firm to alter its own judgment that the courts would
hold that the Rule constitutes a violation of the anti-trust laws.
The opposing opinions, indeed, provide no adequate assurance to
the contrary. One of the opinions cited on the floor of the annual business
session at Boston, while deprecating the likelihood of an attack on the
Rule, conceded that, “. . . any judgment (on this point) must be far from
firm.”
But since the resources of the Institute— not to mention the safety
of those involved in its disciplinary procedures— may be at stake, the lack
of any certainty on the legality of the Rule is in itself sufficient cause to
recommend its deletion.
This argument, of course, can be turned around. It can be claimed
that since the Institute’s own counsel suggests that an adverse verdict is
only “highly probable,” any challenge to the legality of the Rule should
be contested through the highest tribunal in the land. Any such effort,
however, is certain to be costly— not merely in terms of legal expense,
but in terms of the damage which might be inflicted upon the Institute’s
reputation as a result of the attendant publicity. For any complaint or
indictment brought against the Institute is certain to include charges of
13

Arguments fo r Repeal ( continued)

improper and self-seeking practices— and it is a fact of life that the charges
are likely to gain greater press attention and linger longer in the public
mind than a later vindication. It is conceivable that the Institute might
win in the courts— only to lose far more in the forums of public opinion.
As one member in industry observed in the discussion at the annual
meeting, most responsible men in industry and elsewhere who have occa
sion to seek the services of CPAs understand the undesirability of com
petitive bidding. This public support, he added, would be destroyed if the
Institute persisted in a course which would be regarded as willful dis
obedience of the law.
It is argued that more time should have been devoted to the question
before the membership was asked to eliminate a significant provision
of the Code. But those who felt obliged to recommend repeal of the Rule
— the executive committee, the ethics committee and the law firms which
advised them— have already invested a substantial amount of time in
studying the problem for more than a year.
It is also argued that the repeal amendment should be rejected to
permit an exploration of alternative actions which might minimize any
adverse effect of the repeal. But this exploration would not be precluded
by repeal of the Rule. Indeed, such an effort has already been undertaken
by the ethics committee in its Opinion No. 18 on Fees and Professional
Standards.
Any delay in repealing the Rule, moreover, would be an act of im
prudence. The danger inherent in continuance of the Rule, in the judg
ment of competent legal counsel, is “clear and present.” Those who bear
the burden of protecting the funds and the reputation of the Institute
cannot, in good conscience, ignore their advice.
The time to repeal Rule 3.03, therefore, is now.
2.

Arguments Against Repeal

The proposal to repeal Rule 3.03 involves two vital issues— not just
one.
The first of these, obviously, is the question of the legality of the
Rule under the anti-trust laws. But the second issue is of equal or perhaps
even greater significance. That issue is the responsibility of the Institute in
maintaining high standards of professional conduct for the protection
of the public.
Both of these issues deserve the thoughtful consideration of every
member.
The Institute’s legal counsel has announced that it is “highly prob
able” that the Rule would be declared illegal if challenged in the courts
14

Arguments Against Repeal (continued)

under the Sherman Act. It is no reflection upon the firm to observe that
this is merely an opinion— and a somewhat provisional one at that. Other
lawyers could come to a different conclusion— and, indeed, they have.
The views of two other lawyers, one of whom was retained by a special
committee of a state society and the other retained by an accounting firm,
were cited during the discussion of the proposed repeal at the annual
meeting in Boston.
The opinion of one of them made these points:
1. The U. S. Supreme Court has not passed on the question of whether
or not the practice of medicine, law or accounting is in “trade or com
merce;” but even if it should so determine, there must additionally be
an act in restraint of trade.
2. Rule 3.03 is not (as suggested by the Institute’s counsel) “an agree
ment among the members that they will not engage in price competition”
because an audit report involves the reputation of a CPA, and a third
party who relies upon it has a cause of action against the accountant who
is guilty of issuing a false or misleading report.
3. The effect of Rule 3.03 is not price fixing because competitive
bidding implies that the client would determine the scope of the audit,
including the extent of the tests to be made by the auditor.
4. It is inconceivable that the Justice Department would take an
interest in the question of competitive bidding as applied to accountants
and the other professions where the overall public policy existing in the
various states is opposed to the awarding of contracts for professional
services on a competitive basis— particularly because the independence
of the professions has been a long cherished tradition.
5. It is equally inconceivable that a private person or third party
could establish a case based on the failure to receive competitive bids
for an audit unless it be a suit by a disgruntled stockholder against a
corporation’s directors for not securing bids on the theory that the com
pany might have saved some money. This seems quite remote because
a matter of business judgment on the part of corporate directors, in the
absence of fraud or gross negligence, is not ordinarily actionable.
The following two sentences were quoted at the annual meeting from
another opinion: “Though any judgment must be far from firm, my con
clusion is that Rule 3.03 of the Code of Professional Ethics would not
likely provoke an anti-trust attack by the Justice Department. Equally
important, should the provision be attacked in a private treble-damage
suit by a disgruntled accounting firm or by a client, chances would be
good for a successful defense in the court.” It is important to note that
the lawyer who rendered that opinion headed the Anti-Trust Division
of the Justice Department some years ago.
15

Arguments Against Repeal ( continued)

Neither of these opinions preclude the possibility of an attack upon
the Rule on anti-trust grounds; but they do raise a reasonable doubt about
the likelihood of such a challenge— or its success if it should ever mate
rialize.
This doubt is further strengthened by the fact that other professional
organizations— the American Institute of Architects, the American
Society of Civil Engineers, the American Bar Association, to name only
a few—have adopted injunctions against competitive bidding for profes
sional engagements. Like the Institute’s Rule, these proscriptions of bid
ding have existed for a number of years. Yet none of them—nor the
Institute’s own Rule— has so far been subjected to legal challenge. It seems
particularly absurd for CPAs to be concerned about a legal problem
which apparently does not trouble the legal profession.
Why, after such an extended period of immunity, should such an
attack be mounted now?
It is not enough, in response to this inquiry, to refer vaguely to “de
veloping legal concepts” or to speculate about what might happen on the
basis of what has already occurred when the legal lessons of the past are
not clear. This kind of reply is simply not good enough to justify taking
an action of grave import to the profession and to the public which it seeks
to serve with distinction.
Even if the apprehensions of the Institute’s counsel are reasonable,
however, the Institute ought not to be a victim of panic and take a hasty
action which it may later regret.
The present rule on competitive bidding was adopted only five years
ago. It concludes with the observation that competitive bidding “is not in
the public interest, is a form of solicitation, and is unprofessional.”
What has happened in this short interval to suggest that these reasons
in support of a prohibition against competitive bidding are no longer
valid?
If nothing has happened to invalidate them, then the Institute should
not be prepared to sacrifice a rule designed for the protection of the
public because two law firms have expressed the belief that a legal cloud
now hangs over it.
As a responsible organization representing a profession dedicated to
public service, the Institute has an obligation to defend the Rule against
any and all attacks— all the way to the United States Supreme Court if
necessary.
The commitment to retain the Rule might obviously require a heavy
expenditure of funds; but if the profession remains convinced that com
petitive bidding injures the public, then the funds of the Institute could
not be utilized in a better cause.
16

Arguments Against Repeal ( continued)

Nor should the specter— real or imagined— of public criticism deter
the Institute from pursuing this course if conscience dictates it. No doubt
some ill-informed observers might leap to the conclusion that the profes
sion was solely concerned about advancing its own self-interest if it
resisted any effort to nullify the competitive bidding rule. But an equal
number—perhaps a greater number— would be impressed by an organi
zation which was prepared to run serious risks in defense of a professional
standard which protects the public welfare.
But even if the consequences of resistance prove to be as dire as pre
dicted, this would still not justify a retreat from principle.
It is suggested that the Rule is already a “dead letter” because the
threat of legal action inhibits its enforcement. The failure to apply it is
regrettable; but even if it is not enforced, its presence in the Code at least
proclaims the profession’s distaste for an unseemly practice which en
courages substandard performance— and this alone may have a beneficial
influence.
It is suggested, too, that the Institute’s Rule is hardly necessary because
the state boards of accountancy, with legal impunity, can proscribe com
petitive bidding by a properly devised regulation— and that many of them
have already done so. However, any reliance placed by the profession on
state board rules may prove to be illusory, because repeal of the Institute’s
Rule would cause the rules of the state boards to erode. They would
become difficult to enforce and eventually would be eliminated. In any
case, it will require a substantial effort to obtain enabling legislation to
permit the other boards to adopt such regulations— and some will never
be allowed to do so because of the existence of a state anti-trust statute.
It is argued, further, that Opinion No. 18 of the committee on profes
sional ethics provides ample protection against any of the hazards en
visioned by opponents of repeal. The latter, however, consider Opinion
No. 18 to be neither strong nor direct and an inadequate substitute for the
Rule itself. The Opinion is merely the statement of a committee and thus
lacks the force of a rule approved by the full membership.
Much has been made of the fact— and it is a fact— that the Council
approved the amendment for repeal for submission to the membership
by a vote of 135 to 53. But it is also a fact that at that time members of
Council were provided only with oral advice by the Institute’s counsel; they
did not have the benefit of a written statement from the Institute’s counsel,
nor were they aware of other opinions which, at least, suggest that the legal
question does not have only one answer. And it is also a fact worthy of
note that a switch in only 42 votes would have led to the defeat of the
proposal.
17

Arguments Against Repeal ( continued)

There has not been sufficient time since this subject was first exposed
to the membership to consider various alternatives to the present Rule, if
indeed an equally effective alternative can be found. The opponents of
repeal of Rule 3.03, although open-minded on the subject of such an
alternative, do not at this time concede that it can be found.
The proposal to repeal Rule 3.03 is so vital to the public interest and
to the standards of our profession that more time, thought and appraisal
should be devoted to it. The Rule, therefore, should be retained, and this
conclusion expressed by a negative vote on the proposal to repeal it.
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PROPOSAL NO. 2
Amendments to Disciplinary
Clauses of By-Laws
I. Background
The proposed changes in the By-Laws originated with the Trial
Board and the committee on professional ethics. They have been ap
proved by the executive committee and the Council for submission to
the membership in a mail ballot.
The purpose of these proposed changes is to facilitate the function
ing of the Institute’s disciplinary machinery. Under the present By-Laws,
a member convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude may be expelled
only after a hearing by the Trial Board (or a sub-board). If it is found
that he has been convicted, expulsion is mandatory; yet the process may
consume many months. In addition, when a member’s CPA certificate has
been revoked for disciplinary reasons, he must still be brought to trial; and
although expulsion under these circumstances is virtually certain (al
though not mandatory), the elaborate process of trial is required. The
proposed amendment would enable the Institute to terminate promptly
and automatically the membership of a member who has clearly lost his
claim to professional status— without an elaborate and costly trial having
a predictable result.
Moreover, in these cases, the Institute would not be obliged to say,
as it now must say on occasion, that a member has not yet been disci
plined by his professional society even though he has been convicted of
a serious crime or has been deprived of his CPA certificate.
It is also proposed that a new section be added to the By-Laws to
permit the reinstatement by the Trial Board after a three-year lapse of a
member who has been expelled or whose membership has been terminated
for disciplinary reasons. Under the present By-Laws, there is no such
provision for reinstatement, except when a member’s criminal conviction
has been reversed or when the Trial Board has rescinded a prior decision.
19

Since an expelled member is now permanently barred from membership,
the Trial Board has occasionally tended to avoid expulsion in borderline
cases simply because of the permanent nature of the expulsion. The pro
posed amendment takes into account the possibility that an expelled
member might pay his debt to society, rehabilitate himself, and regain
his professional status.
In addition, a member deprived of membership under the automatic
provisions would be automatically reinstated if his conviction for a seri
ous crime or his loss of the CPA certificate upon which the disciplinary
action was based is later set aside.
Finally, the proposed amendments include a new provision which
states, in effect, that a member renders himself liable to explusion or
suspension if he fails to cooperate with the committee on professional
ethics in its investigation of any complaint against him. This is intended
to apply to members who simply refuse to respond to inquiries from
the ethics committee; it is not directed against a member who, on the
advice of legal counsel, declines to provide information for the time being
on the grounds that his rights in a pending legal action might be prejudiced.
One further comment is in order. Three years ago, the membership
was asked to vote on a proposed change in the By-Laws which would
have called for the suspension without prejudice of a member who had
been indicted for a serious crime. This 1963 proposal, which failed to
obtain the required two-thirds favorable vote of the membership, differs
materially from the current proposal. The current amendment would
require action only after conviction of a criminal offense.
The text of the proposed changes in the By-Laws, showing all dele
tions, additions and other language changes necessitated by the amend
ments, appears in the appendix of this booklet.

II. Discussion at Annual Meeting
Although an expression of any opposing viewpoints in regard to
these amendments was invited, none occurred at the annual meeting.

20

PROPOSAL NO. 3
By-Law Amendment to Increase
Size of Executive Committee
I. Background
This proposal originated with the committee on structure. In a report
distributed to all members of the Institute last summer, the committee
suggested that the executive committee should be strengthened to enable
it to provide over-all direction to the broadening programs of the Institute.
The proposal, approved for submission to the membership by the
executive committee and the Council, would expand the size of the execu
tive committee from 13 to 16 members by adding the immediate past
president of the Institute and by increasing the number of elected mem
bers from seven to nine. In order to gain additional continuity in service
on the committee, the proposal also would establish three-year terms for
the elected members.
To give effect to this recommended change it is proposed that Arti
cle IX, Section 2, paragraph (b), of the By-Laws be amended to read
in its entirety as follows:
The executive committee shall consist of the president, the four vice
presidents, the treasurer, the immediate past president, and nine other
members or former members of the Council who shall be elected by the
Council. Of the nine members to be so elected in 1967, three shall serve
for one year, three for two years, and three for three years, or until their
successors have been elected. Thereafter, beginning in 1968, the Council
shall annually elect three members to serve for three years, or until their
successors have been elected. Vacancies occurring among the elected
members shall be filled by the Council for the unexpired terms. No
elected member who has served for a full three-year term shall be eligible
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for reelection until the annual meeting of the Institute next following
completion of his term of service. Seven members shall constitute a
quorum of the committee.

II. Discussion at Annual Meeting
Although discussion of this proposal was invited, none occurred at
the annual meeting.
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APPEN D IX

Text of Proposed Amendments to the
Disciplinary Clauses of the By-Law
It is proposed that Article V and Article VI of the By-Laws be
amended, as follows:
Change Article V (proposed additions are in italics) to read in its entirety
as follow s:
Section 1. Resignations o f members or associates may be offered in writing
at any time and shall be effective on the date o f acceptance. Action upon the
resignation o f a member or associate in good standing shall be taken by the
executive committee, and, in the case o f a member or associate under charges
by the Trial Board or a sub-board appointed to hear the case. N o action shall
be taken on the resignation o f a m em ber or associate with respect to whom
possible charges are under investigation by the com m ittee on professional
ethics. A ction upon the resignation o f a m em ber or associate against whom
charges are pending to be heard by the Trial Board or a sub-board shall be
taken by the Trial Board or the sub-board appointed to hear the case. A ction
upon the resignation o f a m em ber or associate who is suspended under Article
V, Section 6(a) or (c) shall be taken b y the Trial Board or b y an ad h oc co m 
mittee thereof consisting o f at least five m em bers appointed by the chairman
o f the Trial Board or vice chairman, when acting as chairman.
Section 2. A member or associate who fails to pay his annual dues or any
subscription, assessment, or other obligation to the Institute within five months
after such debt has become due shall automatically cease to be a member or
associate o f the Institute, unless in the opinion o f the executive committee it
is not in the best interests o f the profession that his membership or affiliation
be terminated in this way.
Section 3. (a ) A member or associate who shall resign while in good stand
ing may, upon request made in writing to the Institute, be reinstated by the
executive committee without a reinstatement fee.
(b )
The executive committee, in its discretion, may reinstate a member
or an associate whose membership or affiliation has been terminated for non
payment o f dues or any other obligation owing by him to the Institute, pro
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vided that his reinstatement shall not becom e effective until he shall have paid
to the Institute all dues and other obligations owing by him to it at the time
o f such termination, and shall also have paid to it a reinstatement fee in such
amount, if any, as shall have been determined by a general resolution o f the
Council.
(c ) N o person shall be considered to have resigned while in good standing
if at the time o f his resignation he was in debt to the Institute for dues or other
obligations. A member or associate submitting his resignation after the begin
ning o f the fiscal year, but before expiration o f the time limit for payment o f
dues or other obligations, may attain good standing by paying dues prorated
according to the portion o f the fiscal year which has elapsed, provided obliga
tions other than dues shall have been paid in full.
(d ) A member or associate who has resigned or whose membership or
affiliation has been terminated in any manner may not file a new application
for admission but may apply for reinstatement under the applicable provision
o f paragraph (a ) or (b ) o f this section, or Article V I, Section 5(b) or (c).
Section 4. A member or associate renders himself liable to expulsion or
suspension by the Trial Board or a sub-board thereof if
(a ) he refuses or neglects to give effect to any decision o f the Institute or
o f the Council, or
(b ) he infringes any o f these By-Laws or any provision o f the Code o f
Professional Ethics, or
(c ) he is declared by a court o f competent jurisdiction to have committed
any fraud, or
(d ) he is held by the Trial Board or a sub-board thereof to have been
guilty o f an act discreditable to the profession, or to have been convicted o f a
criminal offense which tends to discredit the profession, or
(e ) he is declared by any competent court to be insane or otherwise in
competent, or
( f ) his certificate as a certified public accountant is suspended, revoked or
withdrawn by the authority o f any state, territory, or territorial possession o f
the United States or the District o f Columbia. However, should the secretary
o f the Institute be o f the opinion that it may be in the best interest o f the Insti
tute to terminate, without trial, the membership o f a member or the affiliation
o f an associate whose certificate has been so suspended, revoked or withdrawn,
the secretary shall refer the matter to the executive committee. In such event,
the executive committee may terminate, without trial, such membership or
affiliation, if it determines that it is in the best interest o f the Institute to do so
or license or permit to practice as such or to practice public accounting is sus
pended, revoked, withdrawn or cancelled as a disciplinary measure by any
governmental authority, or
(g) he fails to co-operate with the com m ittee on professional ethics in its
efforts to ascertain the facts pertaining to whether such m em ber or associate
is subject to disciplinary action pursuant to the B y-L a w s o f the Institute. A c 
cordingly, a m em ber or associate shall respond to communications from the
com m ittee requesting information as to such facts within thirty days o f the
mailing o f such communications by registered mail, postage prepaid, addressed
to the m em ber or associate concerned at his last known address, according
to the records o f the Institute.
Section 5. A member or associate shall be expelled if the Trial Board or a
sub-board thereof finds, by a majority vote o f the members present and en
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titled to vote, that he has been convicted by a court o f a felony or other crime
or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude any o f the criminal offenses set
forth in Article V , Section 6(a), or any crime involving moral turpitude; pro
vided, in the case o f such a finding by a sub-board, its finding in this respect is
not reversed by the Trial Board. If the court conviction shall be reversed by a
higher court, such member or associate may request reinstatement, and such
request shall be referred to the committee on professional ethics which, after
investigating all related circumstances, shall report the matter, with the com 
mittee’s recommendation, to the Trial Board, with respect to cases heard
initially by it and cases heard by it on review o f a decision o f a sub-board and
to the sub-board which heard the case, with respect to cases heard by such
sub-board in which no request for review has been granted. Whereupon the
Trial Board or sub-board, as applicable, may by a majority vote o f the mem
bers present and entitled to vote, reinstate such member or associate.
Section 6. (a) The membership or affiliation o f a m em ber or associate who
is convicted by a court o f any o f the follow ing criminal offenses: a crime which
is defined as a felony under the laws o f the convicting jurisdiction; willfully fail
ing to file any incom e tax return which he, as an individual taxpayer, is re
quired to file under the law; willfully attempting to evade or defeat any incom e
tax, or the paym ent thereof, by filing a false and fraudulent incom e tax return
on behalf o f himself or a client; or willfully aiding in the preparation or pres
entation o f a false and fraudulent incom e tax return o f a client; shall becom e
automatically suspended upon mailing a notice o f such suspension, as p ro
vided in paragraph (e) o f this section. Such notice shall be mailed within a
reasonable time after a certified copy o f a judgment o f conviction o f such
criminal offense has been filed with the secretary o f the Institute.
(b) The membership or affiliation o f a m em ber or associate who has been
convicted by a court o f any o f the offenses set forth in paragraph (a) o f this
section, and which conviction has b ecom e final, shall becom e automatically
terminated upon mailing a notice o f such termination, as provided in para
graph (e) o f this section. Such notice shall be mailed within a reasonable time
after a certified copy o f such conviction and evidence that it has b ecom e final
has been filed with the secretary o f the Institute.
(c) The membership or affiliation o f a m em ber or associate w hose certif
icate as a certified public accountant or license or permit to practice as such
or to practice public accounting has been suspended as a disciplinary measure
by any governmental authority shall, except as provided in paragraph (f) o f this
section, b ecom e automatically suspended upon the expiration o f thirty days
after mailing a notice o f such suspension, as provided in paragraph (e) o f this
section. Such notice shall be mailed within a reasonable time after a statement
o f such governmental authority, showing that such certificate, license or permit
has been suspended and specifying the cause and duration o f such suspension
has been filed with the secretary o f the Institute. Such automatic suspension
shall cease upon the expiration o f the period o f suspension so specified.
(d) The membership or affiliation o f a m em ber or associate whose certifi
cate as a certified public accountant or license or permit to practice as such
or to practice public accounting has been revoked, withdrawn or cancelled
as a disciplinary measure by any governmental authority shall, except as p ro
vided in paragraph (f) o f this section, becom e automatically terminated upon
the expiration o f thirty days after mailing a notice o f such termination, as
provided in paragraph (e) o f this section. Such notice shall be mailed within
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a reasonable time after a statement o f such governmental authority showing
that such certificate, license or permit has been revoked, withdrawn or can
celled and specifying the cause o f such revocation, withdrawal or cancellation
has been filed with the secretary o f the Institute.
(e) N otices o f suspension or termination pursuant to paragraph (a), (b),
(c) or (d) o f this section shall be signed b y the secretary o f the Institute and
mailed by registered mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the m em ber or asso
ciate concerned at his last known address according to the records o f the
Institute.
(f) The operation o f paragraph (c) or (d) o f this section shall becom e post
poned if, within thirty days after mailing the notice o f suspension or termina
tion, the secretary o f the Institute receives a request from the m em ber or
associate concerned that the pertinent provision shall not b ecom e operative.
The request shall state briefly the facts and reasons relied upon. A ll such re
quests shall be referred to the Trial Board fo r action thereon by the Trial
Board or by an ad hoc com m ittee thereof consisting o f at least five m em bers
appointed by the chairman o f the Trial Board or vice chairman, when acting
as chairman.
I f the request is denied, the suspension or termination, as the case may be,
shall becom e effective upon such denial, and the m em ber or associate con 
cerned shall be so notified in writing by the secretary. N o appeal to the Trial
Board shall be allowable with respect to a denial o f such a request by the ad
h oc com m ittee.
I f the request is granted, the suspension or termination, as the case may be,
shall not b ecom e effective. In such event, the secretary shall transmit the
matter to the com m ittee on professional ethics to take whatever action it con 
siders proper in the circumstances.
A determination that paragraph (c) or (d) o f this section shall not becom e
operative shall be made only when it clearly appears that, because o f excep
tional or unusual circumstances, it would be inequitable to permit such auto
matic suspension or termination.
(g) W hen a membership or affiliation is suspended or terminated under
paragraph (a), (b), (c) or (d) o f this section, a statement o f such suspension or
termination, giving the reasons therefor, shall be published in The C P A . Such
statement shall be in a form approved by the chairman o f the Trial Board or
the vice chairman when acting as such, and shall disclose the name o f the
m em ber or associate concerned unless the chairman or vice chairman decides
that the name be omitted.
(h) The provisions o f this section shall not preclude the summ oning o f the
m em ber or associate concerned to appear before the Trial Board or a sub
board pursuant to Article V I, nor shall it preclude the imposition o f any pen
alty under Article V , Section 5 , or Article V I, Section 3(b), unless his
membership or affiliation has been terminated pursuant to paragraph (b) or (d)
o f this section.
(i) The period o f suspension pursuant to paragraph (a) or (c) o f this section
shall not be counted in computing the period o f not m ore than two years, for
which the Trial Board or a sub-board may suspend a m em ber or associate
under Article V I, Section 3(b).
Section 6. 7 . The Council may, in its discretion, terminate the affiliation
o f an international associate.
Section 8. (a) The provisions o f Article V , Sections 4, 5 and 6 and Article
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V I, Section 1, which became effective on [date o f adoption by m em bers] shall
not be applied retroactively to any offense or wrongful conduct occurring
prior to such effective date regardless o f the date o f judgment o f conviction or
order o f a governmental authority based upon such offense or wrongful conduct.
A n y such offense or wrongful conduct shall be punishable under the pertinent
B y-L a w provisions which were in effect immediately prior to such effective
date. Such B y-L a w provisions are continued in effect fo r this purpose.
(b) The provisions o f Article V, Section 3(d) and Article V I, Section 5(b)
and (c) which becam e effective on [date o f adoption by m em bers] shall apply
retroactively as well as prospectively.
(c) The provisions o f Article V , Section 1, which becam e effective [date
o f adoption by m em bers] shall apply after such effective date to any resigna
tion, regardless o f when submitted.
Change Article V I (proposed additions are in italics) to read in its en
tirety as follow s:
Section 1. A n y complaint preferred against a member or associate under
Section 4 or 5 o f Article V shall be submitted to the committee on professional
ethics. If, upon consideration o f a complaint, it appears to the committee that
a prima facie case is established showing a violation o f any B y-Law or any
provision o f the Code o f Professional Ethics or conduct discreditable to a
public accountant, the committee on professional ethics shall report the matter
to the secretary o f the Institute, who shall sum m on the member or associate
involved thereby to appear in answer at the next meeting o f the Trial Board
or any sub-board appointed to hear the case; except that in any case involving a
prima facie showing o f violation o f Article V , Section 4, paragraph ( f ) , he
may, in his discretion, submit the matter to the executive committee. In the
event o f such submittal, the executive committee shall either terminate the
membership or affiliation o f such member or associate pursuant to Article V ,
Section 4, paragraph ( f ) or summon him to appear in answer at the next
meeting o f the Trial Board or any sub-board appointed to hear the case, p ro
vided, how ever, that with respect to a case falling within the scope o f Article
V , Section 6, such com m ittee shall have discretion as to whether and when to
report the matter to the secretary fo r such summoning.
Section 2. If the committee on professional ethics shall dismiss any com 
plaint preferred against a member or associate, or shall fail to act thereon
within ninety days after such complaint is presented to it in writing, the m em 
ber or associate preferring the complaint may present the complaint in writing
to the Trial Board; provided, how ever, that this provision shall not apply to a
case falling within the scope o f Article V , Section 6.
The Trial Board shall make such investigation o f the matter as it may deem
necessary, and shall either dismiss the complaint or refer it to the secretary
o f the Institute, who shall summon the member or associate involved thereby
to appear in answer at the next meeting o f the Trial Board or any sub-board
appointed to hear the case.
Section 3. For the purpose o f adjudicating charges against members or
associates o f the Institute, as provided in the foregoing sections:
(a )
The secretary o f the Institute shall mail to the member or associate
concerned, at least thirty days prior to the proposed meeting o f the Trial
Board, or any sub-board appointed to hear the case, written notice o f the
charges to be adjudicated. Such notice, when mailed by registered mail, postage
prepaid, addressed to the member or associate concerned at his last known
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address, according to the records o f the Institute, shall be deemed properly
served.
(b ) After hearing the evidence presented by the committee on profes
sional ethics or other complainant, and by the defense, the Trial Board or sub
board hearing the case, by a majority vote o f the members present and voting,
may admonish or suspend, for a period o f not more than two years, the m em 
ber or associate against whom complaint is made, or by a two-thirds vote o f
the members present and voting, m ay expel such member or associate. The
Trial Board or sub-board hearing the case shall decide, by a majority vote o f
the members present and voting, whether the statement o f the case and the
decision to be published shall disclose the name o f the member or associate
involved. A statement o f the case and the decision o f the Trial Board or sub
board hearing the case shall be prepared by a member or members o f the
Trial Board or the sub-board, as the case may be, under a procedure to be
established by such Trial Board or sub-board, and the statement and decision,
as released by the Trial Board or sub-board, shall be published in The C P A .
N o such publication shall be made until such decision has become effective, as
hereinafter provided.
(c ) The member or associate concerned in a case decided by a sub-board
may request a review by the Trial Board o f the decision o f the sub-board, pro
vided such a request for review is filed with the secretary o f the Trial Board
at the principal office o f the Institute within thirty days after the decision o f the
sub-board, and shall file with such request such information as m ay be re
quired by the rules o f the Trial Board. Such a review shall not be a matter o f
right. Each such request for a review shall be considered by an ad hoc com 
mittee to be appointed by the chairman o f the Trial Board, or its vice chairman
in the event o f his unavailability, and composed o f not less than five members
o f the Trial Board who did not participate in the prior proceedings in the case.
The ad hoc committee shall have power to decide whether or not such a request
for review by the Trial Board shall be allowed, and such committee’s decision
that such a request shall not be allowed shall be final and subject to no further
review. A quorum o f such an ad hoc committee shall consist o f a majority o f
those appointed. If such a request for review is allowed, the Trial Board shall
review the decision o f the sub-board in accordance with its rules o f practice
and procedure. On review o f such a decision the Trial Board may affirm,
m odify, or reverse all or any part o f such decision or make such other disposi
tion o f the case as it deems appropriate. The Trial Board m ay by general rule
indicate the character o f reasons which may be considered to be o f sufficient
importance to warrant an ad hoc committee granting a request for review o f
a decision o f a sub-board.
(d ) A n y decision o f the Trial Board, including any decision reviewing a
decision o f a sub-board, shall becom e effective when made, unless the Trial
Board’s decision indicates otherwise, in which latter event it shall become
effective at the time determined by the Trial Board. A n y decision o f a sub
board shall become effective as fo llow s:
(i) U pon the expiration o f thirty days after it is made, if no request
for review is properly filed within such thirty-day period;
(ii) U pon the denial o f a request for review, if such a request has
been properly filed within the thirty-day period and has becom e denied
by the ad hoc committee; and
(iii) U pon the effective date o f a decision o f the Trial Board affirming
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the decision o f a sub-board in cases where a review has been granted by
the ad hoc committee, and the Trial Board has affirmed the decision o f
such sub-board.
Section 4. A t any time after the publication in The C P A o f a statement o f
the case and decision, the Trial Board may, with respect to a case heard by it,
initially or on review o f a decision o f a sub-board, and the sub-board may,
with respect to a case heard by it in which its decision has become effective
without a review by the Trial Board, by a two-thirds vote o f the members
present and voting, recall, rescind, or m odify such expulsion or suspension, a
statement o f such action to be published in The C P A .
Section 5. (a) Should a judgment o f conviction or an order o f a govern 
mental authority on which the suspension or termination o f membership or
affiliation o f a m em ber or associate was based under Article V , Section 6(a), (b),
(c) or (d ) be reversed or otherwise set aside or invalidated, such suspension shall
terminate or such m em ber or associate shall becom e reinstated, when a certi
fied copy o f the order reversing or otherwise setting aside or invalidating such
conviction or order is filed with the secretary o f the Institute.
(b) A m em ber or associate who has been suspended or expelled pursuant
to Article V , Section 4(c), (d), (e) or (f), or expelled pursuant to Article V ,
Section 5, may request that the suspension terminate or request reinstatement
if the judgment o f conviction, the order in finding o f court or the order o f the
governmental authority, on which the suspension or expulsion was based, has
been reversed or otherwise set aside or invalidated. Such request shall be re
ferred to the com m ittee on professional ethics which, after investigating all
related circumstances, shall report the matter, with the com m ittee’s recom 
mendation, to the Trial Board. W hereupon the Trial Board may, by a majority
vote o f the m em bers present and entitled to vote, terminate the suspension
or reinstate such m em ber or associate, after according him such hearing, if
any, as may be appropriate.
(c) E xcep t as provided in paragraphs (a) and (b) o f this section, a m em ber
or associate whose membership or affiliation has been automatically termi
nated under Article V, Section 6(b) or (d), or who has been expelled by the
Trial Board or a sub-board, or whose resignation has been accepted by the
Trial Board, an ad hoc com m ittee thereof or a sub-board, may, at any time
after three years from the effective date o f such termination, expulsion or
acceptance o f resignation, request reinstatement o f his membership or affilia
tion. Such request shall be referred to the com m ittee on professional ethics,
which, after investigation, shall report the matter, with the com m ittee’s rec
om mendation, to the Trial Board. W hereupon the Trial Board may reinstate
such m em ber or associate on such terms and conditions as it shall determine
to be appropriate. I f an application fo r reinstatement under this paragraph is
denied, the m em ber or associate concerned may again apply fo r reinstatement
at any time after two years from the date o f such denial.
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